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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
By hook or by crook 
After the new and old State Drug Control Agency (FSKN)/Committee (GAK) 
Chief, Viktor Cherkesov, let slip his take on the role of the chekisty in propping up 
the Russian state as the Soviet Union collapsed and publicly bemoaned the 
current infighting, it has become clear that some game is afoot in the Kremlin – it 
might not be a race for succession, but it certainly is a contest among the 
apparatchiki.  Putin's response has been clear...Cherkesov received a promotion 
that was no promotion, but the appearance of parity with the FSB Chief (for more 
on this issue, please see RF Security Services below), and a public rebuke that 
was both mild and a warning of the potential for worse to come.  
 
Putin's response to Cherkesov's comments was pointed:  "It is wrong to bring 
these kinds of problems to the media. When someone behaves that way and ... 
claims that a war among security agencies [is going on], he should, first of all, be 
spotless." (1) 
 
However, it seems that Putin orchestrated events that led to the public outburst.  
Shockingly, the core of the battle is money, tinged with corruption and, of course, 
control of the investigations into the corrupt practices.  It has been noted here 
that Putin had embarked on a path of creating duplicative institutions—dueling 
organizations for investigating corruption— likely as a means of stifling 
opportunistic ambition as his presidency entered its lame duck phase. 
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The surprise of this autumn for Putin well may be that his maneuvers to preserve 
his status and retain authority in 2008 and beyond have, in fact, created the 
seismic shifts that will topple his carefully constructed regime. 
 
In the case of the FSB vs. FSKN (now GAK), an investigation into the Tri Kita 
furniture case allegedly led to the door of FSB chief Patrushev, who is supported 
within the administration by Kremlin Deputy Chief (and siloviki clan leader) Igor 
Sechin, as well as Cadres Chief Viktor Ivanov.  When Cherkesov re-launched the 
investigation, the dismissal of "several FSB generals" was imminent.  Putin 
invited Viktor Ivanov into his meeting with Cherkesov, and reportedly arranged 
for Cherkesov to run into Sechin on his way out of the office. (2) During the 
meeting, Putin requested a decree be drafted on the resignation of the generals, 
but it never surfaced, and the Tri Kita investigation eventually was shuffled away 
from Cherkesov's (and Prosecutor-General Yuri Chaika's) purview. (Chaika's 
battle with former Prosecutor-General and current Justice Minister Vladimir 
Ustinov reflects, only in part, the Kremlin clan warfare; it also has its own 
personal elements.) 
 
When turnabout came for Cherkesov and his FSKN deputies were about to be 
arrested, Cherkesov reportedly appealed directly to Putin, but was rebuffed.  His 
Kommersant article apparently reflects his inability to keep his people 
safeguarded from the institutional muck in which he has waded successfully until 
now.  (3)  The impending arrests of FSKN officials, including Aleksandr Bulbov, 
clearly were anticipated by Cherkesov, as they traveled accompanied by FSKN 
guards, who nearly fired upon the arresting officers (from both the FSB and the 
Investigation Committee) when confronted at Domodedovo Airport. (4)  [For more 
on this issue, please refer to the RF Security Services section below.] 
 
The incident carries an echo of the tumult of the Yel'tsin era, when Aleksandr 
Korzhakov's presidential security forces confronted a faction of the security 
services (then known as FSK) over the actions and influence of oligarch Vladimir 
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Gusinsky.  Episodes like Korzhakov's "Goosehunting" were supposed to be relics 
of the past in Putin's Russia, but, with the instability unleashed by Putin's recent 
political surprises, chaos seems to stalk Russian politics. 
 
Given the lack of institutional stability (and the absence of any viable mechanism 
for succession), Putin needs to keep his potential successors off kilter in order to 
prevent the loss of his own authority before any succession (real or virtual) takes 
place.  However, it has become increasingly evident that the replacement of 
Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov with Viktor Zubkov (the creator of Russia's 
"financial intelligence" service), followed by Putin's decision not only to head 
United Russia, but quite possibly to head the legislative branch of the Russian 
government as well, created greater shock than anticipated. 
 
While debate over Putin's plan to redistribute authority between the executive 
and legislative branch followed hard on the heels of his announcement, President 
Putin eventually had to address concerns about changing the constitutional 
structure of the Russian Government: "We don’t have two centres, we have one 
decision-making centre – the president, and the parliament, of course. As for the 
government, under the provisions of the Constitution it is the executive branch’s 
main body. I do not think it would right to either take any of the government’s 
rights, prerogatives and obligations from it, or to burden it with new ones. We 
certainly do not need to create two centres of power within the executive branch. 
I am not in favour of curtailing the president’s powers. We simply need to ensure 
more effective interaction between the executive, judicial and legislative 
branches of power." (5) 
 
While previous analysis of President Putin's administration and his process of 
decision-making has focused on the circles or clans of advisers around him (see 
previous issue, The ISCIP Analyst, Executive Branch), it is increasingly obvious 
that Putin holds some decisions very close to the vest.  It seems clear that many 
were caught off guard by Putin's recent moves; it is possible his advisers and 
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aides are more influential with mid-level decisions than strategic plans.  
According to a Moskovskii komsomolets report, "Presidential Aide Viktor 
Ivanov…is able to influence low-priority appointments, but nothing more. … Even 
political heavyweights like Igor Sechin and Kremlin administration director Sergei 
Sobyanin often get no advance warning at all about Putin's appointment and 
dismissal pirouettes." (6) 
 
Putin's stake in elections 
While debate continues over the role Putin will play in 2008 and beyond (his 
influence clearly still will remain substantial, but from exactly which seat he will 
exercise power becomes more difficult to discern with each passing story of 
apparatchik unrest), he has lent his name to the electoral platform and program 
of United Russia for the parliamentary elections in December. 
 
The decision to constrain the quantity of OSCE observers (discussed in 
Domestic Issues, below) is worrisome and seems unnecessary.  Recent 
allegations by an opposition leader and onetime Kremlin insider are even more 
troubling.  According to Boris Nemtsov, political council member of the Union of 
Right Forces (SPS), "as the Duma election approaches, the preparation for 
falsifying its results is in full swing." (7) 
 
"At the local level, officials have already received quotas stating where and how 
much [the] United Russia party should get.  Somewhere it is 69 percent, while 
somewhere else it is [a] complete 100 percent.  Governors lean over backwards 
to secure the required result." (8) 
 
As for the possibility of mounting an effective opposition party in Putin's Russia, 
Nemtsov confirms growing concerns: "There have been created the conditions in 
Russia making it extremely dangerous to finance the opposition.  For 
businessmen, the fact became evident after Khodorkovsky's arrest.  The United 
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Russia is the only party in which it is safe to invest, and the investments will be 
good for business." (9) 
 
Perhaps the investments will be good for business, but only for as long as Putin 
can maintain both his authority as the head of state and parity among his 
grasping chekisty Kremlin clans.  His proposal to lead Russia from the parliament 
would buck a long historical trend; perhaps he has come to realize the difficulties 
posed by that task. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "In Turf War, Putin Scolds Ally and Gives Him a Job," Moscow Times, 22 Oct 
07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(2) "The Hook," by Mikhail Fishman and Aleksandr Raskin, Newsweek Russia, 
No. 42, 15-21 Oct 07; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "Security Infighting, All about Money," by Francesca Mereu, 28 Oct 07, The 
Moscow Times via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) "Replies to Journalists’ Questions following the Hot Line," Vladimir Putin via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/10/18/1525_type82915_148865.shtml. 
(6) "Everything decided at the top," by Mikhail Rostovsky, Moskovskii 
komsomolets, No. 242, 25 Oct 07, p. 4; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) "Russia in need of Democracy," by Boris Nemtsov, Kommersant, 1 Nov 07 
via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2007-#227, 1 Nov 07. 
(8) Ibid.  
(9) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Creelea Henderson 
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State Duma elections: Russia answers to no nation 
Vladimir Y. Churov is a former member of the Russian State Duma who was 
chosen as Chairman of the Central Election Commission in March of this year 
after his predecessor, Aleksandr A. Veshnyakov, was ousted for criticizing a new 
set of laws regulating parliamentary elections. (1) A wily, garrulous man, Churov 
is an unlikely choice for arbiter of Russia’s upcoming elections – he does not 
have the legal background thought necessary to parse the subtleties of election 
legislation, (2) and he is known to be partial to monarchy despite its lack of a 
sophisticated electoral system. (3) However, even as his credentials were sniffed 
at on the pages of Kommersant, Russia’s leading business daily, (4) Churov held 
fast to his policy of unstinting, unabashed personal loyalty to President Vladimir 
Putin. That loyalty has proven to be a sufficient qualification for many of Russia’s 
top offices and so it was with Churov, now a veritable kingmaker. He will be 
overseeing a massive power transfer in the State Duma on December 2 and in 
the Kremlin itself next March. 
             
One may well ask whether Churov is the right man for the job. Up to a point, the 
job can be altered to suit the man, and was—in January of this year, Putin 
passed an amendment to the election code allowing people without higher 
education in law to serve on the Commission (5)—but no amount of tailoring will 
change the democratic principle underlying free elections, and to this principle 
Churov has shown himself to be indifferent. 
             
Last April, just two weeks after he had taken over operations at the CEC and 
sent a premonitory rumble through the headquarters of Russia’s political parties, 
where the arrival of campaign season was first sensed, Churov granted his first 
official interview to Kommersant. (6) Although the newspaper had cast doubt on 
his qualifications prior to his appointment, on the day of the interview Churov was 
in high spirits.  
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“Churov’s first law is Putin is always right!” he told the interviewer, waggishly 
reiterating a phrase for which he had become infamous.  
             
As was to be expected, the interviewer pressed Churov about his belief in Putin’s 
infallibility, pointing out that he could not serve both the president and the 
electorate simultaneously in his capacity as head of Russia’s elections. “And if 
Putin is not right, what then?” he asked. 
             
“Could Putin really be wrong?” Churov replied, ingenuously. 
             
“But what if you have that horrible realization: Putin is not right?” continued the 
journalist. 
             
“That would mean that Churov misunderstood something. And must simply think 
it over some more,” laughed the Chairman of the CEC. 
             
Now that he is charged with impartially administering the country’s elections, the 
slavish loyalty that won Churov his post has become a diplomatic liability. His first 
trial in office has come in the form of a standoff between the Kremlin and the 
OSCE over the work of international election observers. With a five week 
countdown to State Duma elections, observer organizations still have not 
received an official invitation to attend the polls. (7) Although Russian law 
empowers the CEC to issue international invitations, (8) Churov evidently has 
opted not to act on the initiative of his office, but to hand over that decision to the 
Kremlin, instead. His lapse already has set off an alarm in Vienna, where the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights are headquartered, and where plans 
for a pre-election visit to Russia to determine the size and nature of the OSCE’s 
impending election observation mission have been shelved for want of sufficient 
time in the lead-up to December elections. In past years, the OSCE had 
deployed long-term election monitors at least six weeks prior to the day of 
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election. (9) “We are fast approaching the point when it becomes difficult for us to 
do our job properly,” said an OSCE spokesperson. (10) 
             
Churov, himself a former delegate to OSCE election observation missions, 
admits that international election monitoring is a useful tool to ensure 
accountability, although a story in the Russian press quoted him likening election 
observers to wolves terrorizing sheep that have gathered to vote. (11) In a recent 
statement he insisted that “Russia attaches great importance to the publicity and 
transparency of the electoral process.” (12) Yet even as he sought to reassure 
the international community that he would act in good faith by admitting 
observers to forthcoming elections, his message was transmuted into a petulant 
assertion of Russian national autonomy by Aleksei Borodavkin, Russian envoy at 
the OSCE, who was quoted as saying, “as for our elections, we are completely 
fulfilling our obligations. They are that we should invite international observers. 
Period.” (13)  
             
It would appear that Borodavkin has been cast to act out the role of schoolyard 
bully in a charade choreographed by the Kremlin to head off OSCE election 
monitoring activities before the start of election season in Russia. A confidential 
brief, undersigned by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Russia, spells out the bloc’s strident platform of non-interference 
for the remaining 48 member countries of the OSCE. (14) The brief, leaked to the 
New York Times on October 25, contains a list of ten “Basic Principles for the 
Organization of ODIHR Observation of National Elections,” each of which 
imposes some limit on the capacity of the OSCE to monitor elections in the 
former Soviet republics. The proposals are stark, their impact far from trivial: the 
number of observers in a mission would be reduced from 450 dispatched for 
State Duma elections in 2004 to no more than 50; all personnel would have to be 
approved by the government of the host state; and monitors’ reports would be 
delivered to the government of the host state only after the official results of the 
election are made public. This is to be followed by the submission of the report to 
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the Permanent Council of the OSCE, where its publication may be blocked by 
any one of the organization’s 55 member states. If adopted by the OSCE, the 
proposals put forward by the Kremlin would nullify the core mandate of the 
premiere election monitoring institution and render its subsequent findings utterly 
irrelevant. 
             
What would Russia gain from that? Slack election standards? Free-for-all fraud 
at the polls? But what need does the Russian government have of electoral 
chicanery, with Putin’s approval rating fixed at around 80 percent, and United 
Russia forecast to pull in a comfortable 70 percent of seats in the State Duma?  
             
A credible argument can be made for a grudge left smoldering years after the 
Orange Revolution contracted Russia’s sphere of influence, a catastrophe for 
which the OSCE is commonly held responsible. By exacting revenge on the 
OSCE, the Kremlin would gain the double satisfaction of seeing a powerful 
international organization wobble, and depriving troublesome opposition 
movements of an important ally.  
             
The likeliest explanation for the Kremlin’s grandiose show of thumbing its nose at 
international election observers may be the most prosaic. It is the principle that 
Churov was chosen as captain of Russian elections to illuminate: Russia is 
accountable to no nation, no geo-political institution, nor any high-minded 
international community, but only to Putin. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) For background on new election laws see: “State Duma elections: No 
candidates? No issues? No problem!” ISCIP Analyst v. 14, no. 1, 20 Sept 07 via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol14/ed1401.html#domestic. 
(2) Irina Nagornykh, “Pereizbirkom,” Kommersant, 14 Mar 07 via 
www.kommersant.ru. 
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(3) Andrei Kolesnikov, “Intervyu s glavoi TsIKa Vladimirom Churovym,” 
Kommersant, 9 Apr 07 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/articles/2007/churov.html?page=5. 
(4) Irina Nagornykh, “Pereizbirkom,” Kommersant, 14 Mar 07 via 
www.kommersant.ru. 
(5) “Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastiye v 
referendume grazhdan RF” via http://www.rg.ru/2007/02/02/referendum-prava-
dok.html. 
(6) Andrei Kolesnikov, “Intervyu s glavoi TsIKa Vladimirom Churovym,” 
Kommersant, 9 Apr 07 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/articles/2007/churov.html?page=5. 
(7) Nikolaus von Twickel, “Vote Monitors Feeling Unwelcome,” Moscow Times, 
26 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) “Mezhdunarodnoye sotrudnichestvo. Mezhdunarodnyie izbiratel’nyie 
standarty v praktike gosudarstv SNG i Evropy,” CEC website via 
http://www.cikrf.ru/international/. 
(9) “How an election mission works,” OSCE website via 
http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/17791.html. 
(10) Neil Buckley and Stefan Wagstyl, “Delays may hinder election monitoring in 
Russia,” Financial Times, 19 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) Tamara Zamyatina, “Vladimir Churov: Whoever Tries to Tamper with the 
System, Will Have to Deal with Me,” Moscow News, 23 Aug 07 via 
http://mnweekly.rian.ru/politics/20070823/55269503.html. 
(12) Andrei Kolesnikov, “Intervyu s glavoi TsIKa Vladimirom Churovym,” 
Kommersant, 9 Apr 07 via 
http://www.kommersant.ru/articles/2007/churov.html?page=5. 
(13) “Russia to set rules for OSCE Duma election observers—envoy,” BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring text of Interfax report, 26 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) C.J. Chivers, “Russia Working to Limit Election Observers,” New York 
Times, 25 Oct 07 via 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/world/europe/25russia.html?_r=1&pagewant
ed=all 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Two arrests in train bombing 
Six weeks ago, a passenger train en route between Moscow and St. Petersburg 
was derailed by an explosion. Although there were no fatalities, 60 persons were 
injured. The initial investigation showed that the bomb was positioned 100 feet 
ahead of a bridge that the train was about to cross and amounted to some 4lb of 
TNT. As such, the blast may have been mistimed: had the bomb exploded 
seconds later, the train would have fallen off the bridge, causing heavy 
casualties. (1)  
    
Within hours of the explosion, authorities claimed that the design of the bomb 
was similar to the one that used to bomb a train in Grozny in 2005, and that 
security images from the scene were being used to create composite images of 
the apparent perpetrators. (2) The attempt to link the attack to the conflict in the 
Caucasus continued, with FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev insisting that Chechen 
separatists were responsible and arguing that terrorism in Russia had not yet 
been “eliminated.” (3)  
       
The timing of the latest (apparent) terror incident did not go unnoticed in the 
media. Gazeta columnist Yulia Latynina claimed that the bombing might have 
been carried out by proxy nationalist forces in an attempt to “persuade” President 
Vladimir Putin to stay for a third term in office.  (4) Clearly, Latynina was 
attempting to draw parallels between the 1999 Moscow apartment bombings and 
Putin’s ascent to the presidency with this incident.  
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On October 24, law-enforcement authorities apparently achieved a breakthrough 
in the case. Working in concert with local police, FSB officers swooped in on a 
village (Ekazhevo) in Ingushetia, where they arrested Markham & Maksharip 
Kidiryev, brothers aged 29 and 30, respectively. The two were moved to Moscow 
for interrogation the same day. According to a statement made by Interior 
Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev—apparently acting as the administration’s 
spokesman in this case—the authorities possess “circumstantial evidence that is 
very compelling” and “very interesting” information tying the brothers to the 
bombing. (5) As yet, Nurgaliyev has not revealed what constitutes this evidence, 
or whether the detainees match the aforementioned composites.   
     
The fact that these arrests appear to have been carried out on the strength of 
circumstantial evidence alone speaks to the absence of a true judicial process of 
law, and the lack of “presumption of innocence” in Russia. At this point in time, 
there is no reason to trust that the arrests are anything but a political game 
designed to show that the Kremlin is tough on security, and to convince the 
population that “national security” demands a vote for the status quo in 
December’s polls. 
 
Litvinenko case moves forward? Or not!  
During the last six months, the investigation into the assassination of Alexandr 
Litvinenko has been in a stalemate. Late in May 2007, British authorities officially 
requested the extradition of former KGB officer Andrei Lugovoi from Russia, 
stating that enough evidence had been gathered to charge him with murder.              
    
Russia’s response came through Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, who published 
a letter to the British Home Office, arguing that due to Russia’s Constitution, it 
was “not possible to satisfy the request of the British Home Office.” Moreover, 
authorities intimated that Lugovoi would be extradited only if Whitehall were to 
accede to the extradition of Boris Berezovsky. (6)  
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Relations between Britain and Russia deteriorated into “tit-for tat” with some 
rapidity: Britain expelled four diplomats from the Russian mission in London, with 
the intent of sending a “clear and proportionate signal” to Moscow, and the 
Kremlin reacted in turn by expelling four British officials. (7)  
    
In the last ten days, British authorities seem to have made a renewed attempt to 
move their investigation forward. According to Interfax, the Crown Prosecution 
Service has asked Russian authorities to take “more investigative actions…in 
relation to Russian businessman and parliamentary candidate Andrei Lugovoi.” 
(8) This investigative action involves “legal assistance needed to secure some 
evidence” of Lugovoi’s complicity in Litvinenko’s murder. (9)  
    
Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika’s office confirmed that the British request had 
been received. Not surprisingly, the response has been to accuse British 
authorities of non-cooperation, in particular of preventing Russian investigators 
from meeting with “the doctors who treated Litvinenko…and who autopsied the 
deceased.” Moreover, Russia has received no “legal assistance” in the criminal 
case into the attempt “at the life of Dmitri Kovtun,” as is “prescribed by the 1959 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.” (10)  
    
Andrei Lugovoi, who is the prime suspect for British authorities, has stated that 
British requests for Russian cooperation are little more than acts of “provocation,” 
and that the rumor (denied by Ambassador Tony Brenton) that British Officers 
were arriving to question him was another act of “provocation.” (11)  
    
The British request to Chaika’s office apparently has not included a repeat 
extradition request. Reports thus far indicate that it is simply a request for 
assistance in resolving the case. As such, the British tactic may be one of 
lowering the level of confrontation and of attempting a new line, in order to move 
forward in the case. If this assumption is correct, the Kremlin clearly is not 
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reciprocating, and Britain’s efforts will come to naught. At this point, it is highly 
doubtful—at best—that Litvinenko’s killer ever will be brought to justice. 
 
Putin & Cherkesov: Making peace?  
Early last month, FSB agents arrested three top-level officers in Gosnarkontrol, 
Russia’s Drug Control Agency. Lieutenant General Aleksandr Bulbov, Yuri Geval 
and Major Sergei Donchenko, all senior deputies to Viktor Cherkesov, the 
agencies’ chief, were charged with a number of offenses, including abuse of 
office, extortion, and illegal wire-tapping.  
    
Cherkesov’s response to the detention of his deputies was to appeal directly to 
the courts for their release and to send an open letter to Kommersant Daily. 
Cherkesov’s letter argued that the arrests were a symptom of internecine 
struggle between the Security Services and that if the struggle continued, the 
network of former Chekists running Russia would lose its power. (12)  
    
President Putin’s reaction to Cherkesov’s article has been two-fold. Speaking to 
Kommersant, he scolded the GSK Chief, stating: “If I was in the shoes of the 
people who are trying to protect the honor of their uniform, I would not throw out 
accusations left and right, especially not through the media. If someone is 
behaving in this way, making these sorts of accusations about a war among the 
secret services, that person himself must be beyond reproach.” (13)  
    
A day after his interview, Putin announced the creation of a new State Committee 
dedicated to fighting the narcotics trade (GAK), and named Cherkesov as its 
head. (14) The decree published on the Kremlin website indicates that the 
Committee will meet at least every two months, and that its role will be to 
“coordinate the work of regional committees,” which are led by the Governors. 
(15)  
The committee, following the “road for which the Anti-Terrorism Committee 
paved the way…must include the leaders of the MVD, and the FSB…the Heads 
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of the Customs and Migration Service,” and every other Security Agency. (16) 
Attendance at meetings apparently is prescribed by law for all the Committee’s 
members.  
    
At first glance, it would appear that Putin has buoyed Cherkesov and put him on 
an equal footing with Patrushev, who chairs the National Anti-Terrorist 
Committee (NAK), which has a similar composition. One key difference between 
the NAK and the new Committee is that the Drugs group does not have an 
operations staff to “organize planning of the utilization of manpower and 
resources.” Ergo, the committee apparently has no operational teeth. (17)  
    
The fact that the GAK has no real power of execution demonstrates that 
Cherkesov’s appointment is not a promotion. Instead, the committee’s creation 
and Cherkesov’s appointment probably constitute nothing more than a move to 
mollify the GSK Chief and silence talk of a “Chekist War.” Putin’s plans for the 
future mean that probably he cannot afford to worry about such a war, while he is 
preparing his plans for the premiership and the presidential succession. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia Opens Train Blast Terror Probe,” The Guardian, 14 Aug 07 via 
www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6849489,00.html.  
(2) Ibid.  
(3) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 1 (20 Sept 07). 
(4) “Russian Authorities May Have Used Nationalists To Organize Derailment—
Pundit,” Ekho Moskvy Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 14 Aug 07; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “2 Suspects Arrested in Train Bombing,” The Moscow Times, 25 Oct 07 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Russia Rejects Britain’s Request For Lugovoi Extradition,” Xinhua News 
Agency, 5 Jul 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Ibid. 
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(8) “London Asks Moscow To Take New Investigative Actions Against Lugovoi,” 
Interfax, 20 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(9) “UK-Russian Cooperation On Litvinenko Case May Resume Soon---Sources,” 
Interfax, 20 Oct 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “New Request From British Investigators Under Litvinenko Case Received—
Prosecutor’s Office,” Interfax, 23 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(11) “Russian Suspect Sees UK’s New Request As Provocation,” Interfax, 24 Oct 
07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(12) “Drug Control Chief Warns of Turf Battle Among Russia’s Special Services,” 
International Herald Tribune, 9 Oct 07 via 
www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/09/europe/EU-GEN-Russia-Kremlin-Turf-
Battle.php. 
(13) “Putin Orders Truce Between Feuding Security Services,” The Times, 23 
Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(14) “In Turf War, Putin Scolds Ally and Gives Him a Job,” The Moscow Times, 
22 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(15) Ibid.  
(16) “Cherkesov Appointment As Head of New Russian Anti-Narcotics 
Committee Assessed,” Report by Natalya Melikova and Marina Obrazkova: 
“Second, Anti-Narcotics. Putin Has His Say in the War Among the Special 
Services,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 Oct 07; OSC Translated Text via World 
News Connection.  
(17) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
Grandiose plans and domestic snafus                   
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Tough talk from the Kremlin once again has the world speculating about a 
renewed arms race.  On 18 October, President Putin reached out to Russia’s 
men in uniform assuring them that the government would take care of their 
needs. (1)  At the same time he again appeared to be asserting Russia’s role as 
a power player on the international stage, when he announced “grandiose” plans 
for the Russian armed forces.  During his annual televised question-and-answer 
session with Russian citizens, Putin outlined an immense ten-year modernization 
program for the armed forces saying, “We will develop missile technology, 
including completely new strategic complexes … our plans are not simply 
considerable, but grandiose.  At the same time they are absolutely realistic.  Our 
armed forces will be more compact but more effective and better able ensure the 
defense of Russia.” (2)  
 
Putin did not specify what kind of “completely new” strategic weapons Russia 
was developing, but he stressed that they will be above and beyond the new 
TOPOL systems currently being tested. (3)  Earlier in the day, Russia test-fired 
an RS-12 TOPOL (NATO reporting name SS-25) to assess the probability of 
extending its service life from 10 years to 21 years.  (4)  Putin asserted that 
modernization will not be limited only to land-based ballistic missiles, but that 
Russia will pay “significant” attention to the entire nuclear triad: Strategic Missile 
Troops, Strategic Aviation and nuclear submarines. (5)  Commenting on the 
development of the Russian Navy, Putin claimed that the building of a new class 
of nuclear-powered submarines (called the “Yuri Dolgoruky”) will be completed 
this year. (6)  He also noted that current construction of two submarines would 
continue and that the Russian Navy has plans to lay the keel of another strategic 
submarine in 2008. (7)  
 
President Putin stated that modernization and upgrade plans also would extend 
beyond the strategic nuclear forces.  He reminded citizens that the Russian Air 
Force already has begun adopting small numbers of the new SU-34 fighter-
bomber, which he called the best assault planes in the world, (8) and detailed 
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plans for the commissioning of a much-delayed fifth generation fighter in 2012 as 
part of a rearmament plan that will be completed by 2015. (9)  According to Putin, 
precision weapons will receive special attention.  Testing of “high-accuracy 
armaments” will continue (10) and the TU-160 bombers from which they are 
launched will be upgraded along with the elderly TU-95 strategic bomber 
systems. (11)  Reconnaissance, communications, and electronic facilities also 
were mentioned, as was the phasing in of the new Iskander-M intermediate-
range cruise missile. (12) 
 
Meanwhile, Russian arms exports are hitting record highs.  Though it still lags far 
behind the US in world-wide sales, Russia ended 2006 as the number two arms 
exporter in the world with 21.6 percent of the market. (13)  State arms export 
monopoly Rosoboroneksport estimated earlier this month that it will sell over $6.5 
billion in weapons, spare parts and services this year, up from $6.1 billion last 
year (14) and has contracts for $22 billion over the next three to five years. (15)  
According to Rosoboroneksport General Director Sergei Chemezov, Russia has 
plans to supply 50 Sukhoi jets this year to Malaysia, Venezuela, Algeria, and 
India. (16)  Air Defense systems will go to the United Arab Emirates, Syria and 
other Arab countries, and possibly to China. (17)  India and Indonesia are in 
negotiations for submarines.  Business is so good, in fact, that Rosoboroneksport 
says they can’t handle a sharp increase (18) in production.  
 
On the other hand, Russia’s own Armed Forces seem to be living off the 
leftovers.  According to Komsomolskaya pravda, the Russian Air Force was 
scheduled to take delivery of nine new fighter jets this year, but they have 
received only three; the Army was promised 91 tanks, but to date has received 
only 31. (19)  Though a new State Armaments Program for 2007-2015 was 
adopted in 2006, with $160 billion going to the Defense Ministry, wrangling over 
prices and payment procedures has held up production and delivery of hardware. 
(20)  The bottom line is that Rosoboroneksport can get more money for the same 
product with less red tape by selling to foreigners, and it prefers to do so. 
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President Putin counts Russia’s renewed military muscle as one of the major 
achievements of his presidency, (21) and the flexing of that muscle has received 
much attention in recent months.  Renewed long-range strategic bomber patrols, 
threats to target European countries in retribution for US radar systems and 
missiles in Eastern Europe and repeated rhetoric about new and improved 
nuclear weapons has sparked fears of another Cold War. (See The ISCIP 
Analyst, 19 Sep 07.)  
 
Russian rhetoric, however, should not be mistaken for reality.  The Russian 
military is currently only 25- 50 percent the size of its Soviet predecessor. (22)  
Military reform has been promised for two decades, and the chief of the general 
staff admitted recently that it will likely go on indefinitely. (23)  Troop readiness, 
training, and recruitment remain major problems, (See The ISCIP Analyst, 15 Oct 
07) and after nearly two decades on a starvation diet, the Russian defense 
industry is not willing or able to subsidize government orders.  Recent attention 
and focus on the military likely will lead to an increase in capability for the 
Russian armed forces, and any discussion of a new nuclear capability is certainly 
cause for international scrutiny.  But, Russia is a long way from becoming a peer 
competitor to the US military.  Putin’s plans to get there by 2015 are indeed 
grandiose, but they are not realistic. 
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 20 
(5) “Putin Says Russia Has “Grandiose” Military Build-up Plans,” RTR Rossiya, 
Moscow, in Russian; BBC Monitoring, 18 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Russia to Have Another Nuclear Submarine, New Fighter Jet,” TASS, 18 Oct 
07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Ibid.  
(8) Ibid.  
(9) “Putin Promises New Nuclear Missiles,” The Moscow Times, 19 Oct 07 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/10/19/011.html.  
(10) “Russia to Have Another Nuclear Submarine, New Fighter Jet,” TASS, 18 
Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) “Putin Promises New Nuclear Missiles,” The Moscow Times, 19 Oct 07 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/10/19/011.html.  
(12) “Russia to Have Another Nuclear Submarine, New Fighter Jet,” TASS, 18 
Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) “US Reaffirms Leadership in World Arms Trade,” Agence France Presse, 1 
Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) “Russia Could Export $6.5 Billion Worth of Arms in 2007,” RusData Dialine – 
Russian Press Digest, 2 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) “Russia has Weapons Export Contracts Worth 22BN Dollars – Arms Trader,” 
RIA Novosti, Moscow, in Russian; BBC Monitoring, 9 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) “Russia Could Export $6.5 Billion Worth of Arms in 2007,” RusData Dialine – 
Russian Press Digest, 2 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) Ibid.  
(18) “Russia has Weapons Export Contracts Worth 22BN Dollars – Arms Trader,” 
RIA Novosti, Moscow, in Russian; BBC Monitoring, 9 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(19) “We’ve Got the Money – But Where are the Tanks?” Komsomolskaya 
pravda, 17 Oct 07 via Johnson’s Russia List #218, 18 Oct 07. 
(20) Ibid.  
(21) “Russia’s Doing Great.  Or Is It?” International Herald Tribune, 22 Oct 07 via 
Johnson’s Russia List, #221, 24 Oct 07. 
 21 
(22) “Should the West Brace for Russia’s Military Build-up?” The China Post, 31 
Aug 07 via World News Connection and “Russia’s Doing Great.  Or Is It?” 
International Herald Tribune, 22 Oct 07 via Johnson’s Russia List #221, 24 Oct 
07. 
(23) “Russia’s Doing Great.  Or Is It?” Ibid. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Melissa McGann 
 
Missile defense system: A bargaining chip? 
On 23 October during a visit to Prague, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
publicized a proposal to postpone activation of the US missile defense sites in 
Eastern Europe, if Russia in return pressures Iran to halt its nuclear program. In 
January 2007, plans for the US missile defense system officially were announced 
to include the installation of missile interceptors in Poland and linked to a missile 
tracking system in the Czech Republic. (1) Russia continues to express concerns 
that the missile defense system will be used to target Russian intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, rather than its stated purpose to defend against missile attacks 
by “rogue states,” such as Iran and North Korea. (2) During a recent press 
conference in Brussels, US Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-Asian Affairs 
Daniel Fried reiterated that the missile defense shield is intended to defend 
against impending threats from Iran, and its activation would be postponed if Iran 
was no longer determined to be a threat. (3) As reported by US Defense 
Department spokesman Geoff Morrell, “It is our intention to proceed with the 
construction of missile defense in Europe, but the pace at which it becomes 
operational could be adjusted to meet the threat.” (4) The US proposal appears 
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to signal a shift in its approach by attempting to appease Russia’s stated 
concerns over the US missile defense shield and gain Russian cooperation in 
pressuring Iran to stop its nuclear ambitions. 
 
On 12 October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister 
Anatoli Serdyukov met with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Moscow with the stated agenda of reaching 
an agreement on plans for the missile defense system. After a forty-minute wait 
for President Putin, Rice and Gates introduced new proposals of cooperation 
with Russia on the missile defense system, although Putin expressed his 
continuing doubts at the outset of the meetings, and Russia still adamantly is 
opposed to US plans for moving forward in Eastern Europe. (5)  These talks 
failed to bolster cooperation between the two nations on the basis of mutual 
defense against threats from the Middle East, the most immediate being Iran.  
 
The intensified Russian-US discussions regarding the missile defense system 
take place against the backdrop of the recent Caspian Sea summit in Tehran. 
Although the stated purpose of the summit was to reach an agreement regarding 
the Caspian Sea’s legal status, the timing of Putin’s visit to Tehran was 
considered more significant, in light of the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear 
program. (6)  Putin’s visit to Tehran, the first by a Russian leader since 1943, (7) 
resulted in a political declaration by the five nations not to use aggressive force 
against one another. (8) This declaration, along with economic agreements, was 
reported to strengthen Iran’s regional position and reaffirm Iran’s influence on the 
international stage. This contradicts the vigorous attempts made by the West to 
isolate Iran through strengthened sanctions. According to some analysts, the 
recent Caspian Sea Summit agreement in effect obligates Russia to defend 
Iran’s interests if diplomacy fails and the US resorts to military action against 
Iran. (9) 
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On 17 October, at a meeting of NATO ambassadors and top Russian security 
officials, the US announced a package of concessions regarding the missile 
defense system. The offer was presented by Daniel Fried and consisted of three 
main components of cooperation, in what appeared to be an attempt to allay 
Russian concerns. (10) The first proposal by the US is that the antimissile 
defense system would be deployed based on a threat, which would be jointly 
recognized by Russia and the US. (11) The second component of the offer is that 
the US missile defense program in Eastern Europe should be linked with the 
Gabala facility in Azerbaijan, which Putin had offered as an alternative at the G-8 
summit in July 2007. (12) The final component in the US proposal is that Russia 
would be able to monitor US activities in Poland and the Czech Republic by 
having officers stationed in both countries. (13) Russia reportedly responded with 
interest to the US offer, but continues to oppose plans to move forward on the 
missile defense system.  
 
Through a series of inconsistent messages from the US, proposals and deals 
that link the missile defense shield to Iran’s nuclear program and Russia’s ability 
to convince Iran to halt nuclear development have appeared in the media; it 
appears, however, that plans for the missile defense shield continue to move 
forward.  On 23 October, at the US Defense University in Washington, President 
Bush reiterated that a nuclear Iran would pose a threat to the entire international 
community and emphasized the immediate need for a missile defense system. 
(14) Bush even mentioned the possibility of World War III, should Iran come to 
possess nuclear weapons. (15) Following these statements and in what appears 
as an attempt to appease Russian concerns, Robert Gates hinted that the US 
would delay the activation of the missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech 
Republic until the Iranian threat is definite. (16) Tom Casey, a US State 
Department Spokesman, corrected confusion over statements that the missile 
defense program may be delayed, by saying, “That’s simply not true,” and 
verified that the US intended to continue plans for the deployment of the missile 
defense system based on the imminent Iranian threat. (17)  Additionally, on 25 
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October, the US implemented further sanctions against Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guard Corps. (18) Russia has responded negatively to this most recent set of 
sanctions against Iran, calling them counterproductive. (19) 
 
Statements made by Russia regarding the missile defense system continue to 
oppose plans for moving forward. In a live, televised phone-in on 18 October, 
Putin reassured the public that if Russia is not consulted regarding US plans for 
missile defense, then Russia would be prepared to defend itself to restore 
stability in the region. (20) Putin also hinted at the development of what he called 
a “completely new” nuclear weapon. During the live phone-in show, Putin 
reiterated in relation to Iran that, “direct dialog with the leaders of states…is the 
shortest path to success, rather than a policy of threats, sanctions, and a 
resolution to use force.” (21)  During the recent NATO meeting, Russia’s Defense 
Minister Anatoli Serdyukov stated, “All that has been proposed to us does not 
satisfy us, our position remains the same,” although he added that Washington 
was “beginning to better understand our concerns.” (22) Following the recent EU-
Russia summit in Portugal, Putin drew a non-apparent analogy between the 
missile defense system and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought Russia 
and the US to the brink of nuclear war. (23) 
 
The deals proposed by the US reportedly fall short of Russian expectations, and 
that Moscow expects a major reward if it were to join the West in pressuring Iran 
to halt its nuclear ambitions. (24) Russia and the US appear to hold 
fundamentally incompatible views concerning Iran as an immediate nuclear 
threat. So far, it seems that the strategy of using the missile defense system as a 
bargaining chip to gain Russian support in pressuring Iran to halt its nuclear 
ambitions has been unsuccessful. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Russia prepares for struggle over Arctic resources 
As part of an ongoing campaign to stake a claim over extensive portions of the 
Arctic seabed, Russian Minister of Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev said on 
October 25 that “we believe that the research results of the Arctic-2007 
expedition are sufficient for a bid to include the Lomonosov Ridge in Russia's 
economic zone." (1) The results are to be announced officially by scientists in 
December 2007, after which Russia presumably will submit its bid for sovereignty 
over the seabed in question to the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) – a bid the commission previously has denied, on the 
grounds of insufficient scientific evidence to back up the claim. Whether or not it 
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will be recognized this time is uncertain, but what does appear certain is that 
Russia lately has been making serious efforts on several fronts in what various 
media sources already have begun calling a future battle over ownership of the 
thawing Arctic Ocean – or, rather, over what lies underneath it. 
 
The “Arctic-2007” expedition to which Trutnev referred drew widespread attention 
on August 2, when two submersibles planted a titanium Russian flag on the 
bottom of the ocean at the North Pole. That gesture, though obviously symbolic 
(Yuri Kazmin, the Russian member of CLCS, has emphasized for the record that 
“fixing a flag gives no legal right to the shelf. Russia's position is the same”), (2) 
raised eyebrows and provoked some angry responses in the other countries that 
have an Arctic coastline, particularly Canada, which has its own long history of 
claiming Arctic territory, including the North Pole. "There is no question over 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic,” Canadian Foreign Minister Peter Mackay 
told journalists on August 2 – the same day that news of the undersea Russian 
flag was announced. “We have established, a long time ago, that these are 
Canadian waters and this is Canadian property. You can't go around the world 
these days dropping a flag somewhere. This isn't the 14th or 15th century….This 
is Canadian territory, plain and simple." (3) Plain and simple as far as Canadians 
are concerned, perhaps – but, whose territory is it really? 
 
Normally, maritime law defines a country’s territorial waters as those extending to 
within 200 nautical miles (322 kilometers) of its coastline. Since 1980, however, 
exceptions have been made in cases where the outer edge of the continental 
shelf adjacent to the country in question extends beyond that limit. It was 
precisely for the purpose of reviewing claims for such exceptions that CLCS was 
established. (4) Since then, not only Russia, but also Canada and Denmark 
(through its possession of Greenland) have tried—thus far, unsuccessfully—to 
denote the various undersea mountain ranges that stretch across the Arctic 
seabed as extensions of their respective continental shelves. Until very recently, 
however, such claims reasonably could have been dismissed as petty quibbles, 
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hardly worth any attention. Now, there are compelling reasons to believe that this 
may change very dramatically and very soon. 
 
What appears to be brewing is, according to Time’s James Graff, “a perfect 
storm seeded with political opportunism, national pride, military muscle flexing, 
high energy prices and the arcane exigencies of international law.” (5) The 
ultimate trigger is global warming, which already has reduced the size of the 
Arctic ice cap by nearly 25% of what it was 30 years ago, and which, according 
to at least one scientist, may make the entire Arctic Ocean ice-free during the 
summer months, by as early as 2040. (6) This, of course, has all sorts of 
worldwide implications, but the one at stake in the Arctic seabed dispute is the 
fact that as much as 25% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves, according to a 
report made by the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 2000, may lie under the 
ocean floor. For a country that already appears to have tied the resurgence of its 
global clout to its control over energy resources, and which enjoys maximum 
geographic advantage when it comes to access to the Arctic Ocean, it is not 
difficult to imagine the opportunities envisioned. 
   
Indeed, in spite of all its shortcomings in other areas, Russia has the potential to 
make serious gains on the Arctic issue, owing to a number of advantages over its 
rivals. For one thing, as Graff points out, “Russia is already a dominant force in 
the Arctic; it has the world's largest fleet of icebreakers and long experience 
developing its icy northern coastline.” (7) This dominance, the result of a long 
and extensive history of polar exploration, means that Russia, according to one 
analyst, “has the will and means to conduct the required research, pursue its 
claim through the mechanisms established by the Convention, and defend its 
position on the ground.” (8) The purpose of the flag-planting endeavor, then, was 
to demonstrate that will and means. “This expedition shows that the Arctic 
continental shelf is a matter of Russian vital national interest that will be pursued 
with full force.” (9) The question is to what extent the other countries in the region 
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will try match Russia’s determination, and if they do, how that rivalry will play out 
during the next decade and possibly longer. 
 
Another possible advantage for Russia may be the various disputes, some 
ongoing and some that may develop, between its competitors. According to 
Nikolas Gvosdev of The National Interest, the future conflict won’t necessarily be 
“Russia versus the West, but a coalition of states who can make claims versus 
those who want to challenge them.” (10) There is, indeed, some evidence to 
support this view. For example, Canada’s emphasis of its Arctic claims has not 
been very well-received by the United States, which has refused to recognize 
them – particularly those regarding ownership of the famous Northwest Passage, 
which also has become an issue, now that global warming is beginning to allow 
the waterway to be used as a regular shipping lane during the summer. While 
such disagreements may seem petty in comparison to what is at stake (given 
that a quarter of the world’s available petroleum might be concerned), by the time 
the parties involved come to realize this fully, it may be too late. 
 
But, many problems remain. Even if Russia is successful in claiming the seabed 
adjacent to the Lomonosov Ridge as its own economic zone, this does not mean 
that it will be able automatically to exploit this opportunity. Polar exploration is 
one thing; undersea drilling in an environment as hostile as the Arctic Ocean is 
quite another – and one in which Russian know-how still has quite a long way to 
go. But, efforts on this front are taking place parallel to those along the 
geographic-scientific-diplomatic one. On October 25, Gazprom announced that it 
has decided to partner with StatOilHydro, a Norwegian company, to develop the 
Shtokman natural gas field under the Barents Sea. (11) As a result of the 
partnership, Gazprom hopes to learn from Norway’s extensive experience in, and 
develop technology for, undersea drilling in northern waters. StatOil and Hydro 
long have been drilling undersea oil and gas in the North Atlantic off the west 
coast of Norway, and are considered experts in this field. (12) If all goes well for 
Russia, its underwater extraction capabilities will have advanced sufficiently by 
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the time development of the Arctic seabed is legally and physically possible, so 
that it will be able to take full advantage of this potentially vast resource. 
 
There are many unknowns, of course. Will Russia’s claims for sovereignty be 
successful? Even if they are, how will the other countries of the Arctic basin 
respond? Will Russia develop its own capabilities for undersea drilling fast 
enough to monopolize whatever territory it is able to claim, or will it remain 
dependent, as it currently is, on outside assistance? Is there really enough oil 
under the Arctic Ocean to be worth the effort needed to monopolize it? The real 
amount is highly disputed, and not all agree with the USGS’s assessment. (13) 
Finally, no one knows for sure how fast global warming will take place, or 
whether it may, in fact, be reversed. One can expect, however, that Russia’s 
efforts to become master of the Arctic will continue and possibly intensify over 
the next several years. How others will respond, and how the struggle ultimately 
will be decided, remains to be seen.  
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KYRGYSTAN 
New constitution, new parliament, as executive clings to old methods 
Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional referendum took place duly as scheduled on October 
21, over the protests of various opposition members.  Voters overwhelmingly 
approved the constitutional amendments and the vote was declared valid, (1) in 
spite of international observers’ allegations of ballot-stuffing and other violations, 
(2) as well as the revelation by Central Electoral Commission member Jyldyz 
Joldosheva (only three days prior to the referendum) that voter registration lists 
contained an unspecified number of names belonging to voters who were 
deceased.   Ms. Joldosheva assured the public that since the CEC’s initial 
discovery, the lists had been purged of all invalid names, but then stated that, in 
fact, it is not the responsibility of the CEC to compile voter registration lists, but 
 32 
that of local governments, (3) thereby neatly shifting the blame for any further 
irregularities onto hundreds of local election offices.  
 
On October 22, President Kurmanbek Bakiev signed a decree dissolving the 
Jogorku Kengesh (parliament), in order to clear the way for new elections. (4)  
The amended constitution increases the number of parliamentary seats from 75 
to 90 and also requires that all deputies now be elected based on a party slate 
system, eliminating the handful of single mandates that previously had been 
permitted.  These changes make the current parliament invalid and dictate that 
new elections must be held, although the president undoubtedly is far from 
displeased to bid good-bye to the current group of deputies, a number of whom 
not only opposed his policies, but also repeatedly called for his resignation.  
Bakiev has set new elections for December 16 (elections must be held within 60 
days of parliament’s dissolution), (5) a date which Jogorku Kengesh Speaker 
Marat Sultanov has deemed ten years too early: “It will take exactly this period of 
time [ten years] before the party system becomes stronger. Political parties and 
their initial cells should be formed, and society itself should be prepared for this.” 
(6)  However, given the fact that the majority of MPs currently are elected based 
on party slates, the new electoral system does not represent a drastic change 
and may not be so difficult to implement; the party slate model already exists and 
must simply be extended to incorporate all districts. 
 
The real danger to Kyrgyzstan’s political system stems not from the elections 
themselves, but from President Bakiev’s enhanced authority (granted to him by 
the referendum) to appoint and dismiss government officials at the ministerial 
level all the way down to local municipal administrations, as well as his decision 
to establish and chair a new party, the Ak Zhol eldik partiasy (Bright Path 
People’s Party), which will participate in the December elections. (7)  It is clearly 
unconstitutional for the president to be a member of a political party, much less to 
create one himself, a fact that was pointed out to Bakiev when he first broached 
the subject, and which he himself acknowledged in late September. (8)  A few 
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weeks later, his admission seemed to have been all but forgotten as he proudly 
announced: “I have decided to create and support a new party - a party of 
creativity, responsibility, a party of action, which will be called Ak-Jol eldik 
partiasy… It will be a party of people who want to work for the welfare of the 
Kyrgyz people. It is not a party of bosses.” (9)  The president’s justification for 
creating a new party was that, although there are already just over 100 political 
parties in Kyrgyzstan, many of them are too small to be of much consequence: 
“Very few of them take on any responsibility – at best, they just criticise the 
authorities.  As yet there hasn’t been any party that sets about doing actual work. 
So I have taken a decision myself to create a new political force, a party of 
construction, responsibility and action.” (10)  In other words, due to his 
displeasure at the often scathing criticism leveled at him by numerous political 
parties and movements, President Bakiev has decided to create a political force 
whose members would be obliged to support him.  One day after Ak-Jol’s 
founding, following the party’s official registration with the Ministry of Justice, 
Bakiev resigned from his post as party chairman and suspended his 
membership, at least for the duration of his presidency. (11)  Of course, it is 
abundantly clear to all and sundry, including the party’s members and the 
country’s voters, to whom Ak-Jol owes its loyalty and very existence; with the 
president’s weight behind it, Ak-Jol undoubtedly will have little trouble obtaining 
media access to publicize its platform and conduct a campaign.  Various experts 
have predicted that Ak-Jol will come to serve as an umbrella movement for a 
number of the other pro-presidential parties; should the majority of these parties 
(such as Moya Strana/My Country, chaired by head presidential administration 
head Medet Sadyrkulov; Novy Kyrgyzstan/New Kyrgyzstan, chaired by 
presidential adviser Usen Sydykov; and the Social Democratic Party, co-chaired 
by Prime Minister Almaz Atambaev and Finance Minister Akylbek Japarov) (12) 
join forces with Ak-Jol, it will become a powerful movement, indeed.  Even 
without the support of the rest of the pro-presidential factions, the simple fact that 
Bakiev openly supports the party is bound to garner its members a significant 
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number of parliamentary seats in the December elections, with or without 
fraudulent electoral practices. 
 
Pro-presidential parties are hardly uncommon in Central Asia; in fact, Bakiev was 
the one exception to the rule, and therefore the sole president to observe the 
laws set out by his country’s constitution.  The fact that he so blithely, and with 
full knowledge of his transgression, contravened the law and that no one has 
challenged his actions in a court of law, does not bode well for Kyrgyzstan’s 
further political development and the upcoming parliamentary elections will 
provide a good litmus test for the direction of that development: backward, to an 
era more akin to Soviet one-party rule, or forward, toward a more democratic, 
politically open society. 
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By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine still waits for government 
More than one month since Ukraine’s parliamentary election, the country remains 
in leadership limbo, as negotiations over a new government drag on. While a 
government coalition including the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) and 
President Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc (OU-
PSD) has seemed likely since preliminary results were released, the lengthy 
negotiations suggest that this is not a done deal.   Some within OU-PSD instead 
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are encouraging a coalition with the party of the current Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovych. 
 
The sluggish pace of the new government’s formation has led to frustration not 
only among Ukraine’s voters, but also among international investors and officials 
who must wait to finalize meetings, agreements, and future plans.  It is difficult, 
after all, to negotiate over things like WTO membership, visa protocols, future 
gas deals, and implementation of EU cooperation accords when there is no final 
word on who will be in charge next month.  
 
This is particularly problematic since a new government led by Yulia 
Tymoshenko—Ukraine's former prime minister and current opposition leader—
would differ significantly from that of the Yanukovych government.  In particular, 
while the Yanukovych government drastically has slowed reforms, including 
those necessary for WTO membership, Tymoshenko has vowed to implement 
rapid Western-style reforms.   It is not a surprise that the greatest progress 
toward WTO membership since 2004 came during the nine months of 
Tymoshenko’s premiership. 
 
However, Tymoshenko needs the support of President Viktor Yushchenko’s Our 
Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense (OU-PSD) to return to the prime minister’s post.  
While the vast majority of OU-PSD members strongly support such a coalition, a 
small group of roughly 15 deputies within the bloc prefers a coalition with 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions.  Furthermore, Yushchenko has been lukewarm 
on the idea of a premiership for a woman he views as a rival, particularly since 
the prime minister’s position has about equal power to that of the president.   
This same issue helped lead to her dismissal in 2005. 
 
The negotiation process also has been stalled by inexplicable delays in 
submitting election count protocols to the Central Election Commission and now-
dismissed court challenges to the results. 
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Despite the political stagnation resulting from the lack of a clear plan for 
government formation, the majority of Ukraine’s politicians seem unconcerned.  It 
is now likely that the new parliament will not sit until the end of the week of 
November 4 at the earliest.  A vote for a new government, it seems, could take 
yet another week (at least).  The calls of the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko and its 
allies in OU-PSD for a speedy confirmation of the coalition government have 
fallen on the deafest of ears. 
 
This scenario is precisely one that EU officials hoped Ukraine would avoid. The 
country has been mired in a series of political crises since Tymoshenko’s 
dismissal in September of 2005.  In March 2006, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko 
could not overcome differences following regular parliamentary elections, in order 
to form a new majority coalition and government.   Instead, Yushchenko agreed 
to the premiership of Yanukovych—his 2004 presidential opponent—after almost 
five months of negotiations, while the country was overseen by a caretaker 
government.  The negotiated agreements were never fulfilled, leading to 
Yushchenko’s dismissal of parliament and last month’s snap elections. 
 
The worst scenario for Ukraine would be to repeat those missteps.  And yet, 
Yushchenko remains reluctant to embrace a coalition with BYuT fully.  In recent 
statements calling for a “democratic coalition,” he rarely speaks Tymoshenko’s 
name or the name of her political bloc.  
 
Most recently, Yushchenko suggested that the signing of a new "unity pact" by 
the country's political leaders "would be welcomed." (1) The first such pact was 
signed by Yushchenko, Yanukovych and other party leaders in 2006, and the 
five-page document was said to provide the foundation for all future policy 
decisions in the country. “The basics of the definition of Ukraine's domestic and 
foreign policy, of its continuity, have been completed,” Yushchenko said at the 
time.  (2) 
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Tymoshenko refused to sign that document, suggesting it was unworkable and 
essentially worthless.  In essence, the document was designed to remove all 
differences among parties by committing them to the pursuit of one vague 
"national" program.  Following the pact, Yushchenko introduced Yanukovych's 
name to become premier. 
 
Less than two months later, the "pact" was in tatters.  "Ukraine's process of 
integration into the WTO is being wrecked, the program of Ukraine's accession to 
the EU has been basically stopped and there has been a fundamental block on 
Ukraine's entry into NATO,” Yushchenko's bloc said. (3) The bloc suggested 
Yanukovych was not following the policies agreed upon in the pact.  Within one 
year, Yushchenko had dissolved parliament, accusing Yanukovych's party of 
"betrayal." (4) 
 
Yet inexplicably, Yushchenko is considering repeating the same idea.  It is likely 
that Tymoshenko again will refuse to sign a "unity agreement" with Yanukovych's 
party and the Communist Party, since their programs differ so greatly.  This could 
create new potential for disagreement between the two former Orange leaders. 
 
In order to meet Yushchenko's concerns, Tymoshenko has proposed a sweeping 
new Law on the Opposition, which would give Yanukovych's party—as the 
largest in the opposition—unprecedented rights to control parliamentary 
committees overseeing the budget process.  She also has agreed to grant the 
opposition a new position of Deputy Prime Minister for Relations with the 
Parliament and several deputy minister portfolios.  It is unclear why a new "pact" 
would be needed, given these concessions. 
 
As these discussions continue, Ukrainians sit and wait for a government, much 
as they’ve been sitting and waiting for most of the last two years.  Since 2004’s 
Orange Revolution, Ukraine has seen three Prime Ministers and many more 
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changes at the level of minister.  Fully 13 months of this time, the governments 
have been forced to function in a caretaker fashion, unable to implement 
changes or new initiatives.  The country has had no functioning parliament for 
eight months this year, following its dismissal.   But Ukraine’s leaders are in no 
rush to usher in a new government. 
 
This may be partly to force Tymoshenko into concessions, and partly to ensure 
that some individuals are able to maximize their informal “severance packages.”  
It is no secret in Ukraine that outgoing governments and/or ministers routinely 
receive (or create) “deals” involving property or other financial bonuses from the 
state.  More time likely equals more deals – and a larger budget deficit for the 
new government. 
 
In the meantime, Western governments are left to puzzle over Ukraine’s inability 
to form a stable parliamentary majority and cabinet.  Prior to the elections, 
several Western representatives privately suggested that, following the poll, 
Ukraine’s leaders had a perfect opportunity to demonstrate their ability to work 
efficiently, decisively and productively – an ability they have not shown 
abundantly in the past.  While many promises have been made since 2004’s 
Orange Revolution, very few have been kept.  Ukraine has been unable to reform 
its tax, customs, justice, or security systems.  Should the country continue to be 
mired in political crisis, indecision and confusion, it risks not only angering voters, 
but also losing its international credibility. 
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